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Abstract 
This paper explores the politics of a remarkable, if minor, conjuncture in world 
history. In the late 19th and early 20th century, Ireland saw a combination of 
(partially) successful land reform pushed by massive peasant resistance and a 
(partially) successful breaking away from the world's leading imperial power. 
This dramatic transformation, with few parallels close in place or time, was 
closely associated with processes of ethno-religious sectarianism and intensifying 
conflict between a declining Anglo-Irish imperial service class and a conservative 
Catholic nationalism, which marginalised labour and women's movements as 
well as alternative cultural discourses. 
As is well known, a number of defectors from the Anglo-Irish caste (such as WB 
Yeats) explored the universalist new religious movement of Theosophy as an 
alternative way of positioning themselves in Irish (or, occasionally, Indian) 
nationalist politics and culture. What is less well known is that a number of Irish 
people, some Anglo-Irish and some Catholic plebeians by upbringing, "went 
                                                   
1 This paper draws on joint work with Alicia Turner (York University, Toronto) and Brian Bocking 
(University College Cork) on the life and context of U Dhammaloka. Some of my own early research 
findings on Dhammaloka have been published in the Journal of Global Buddhism; those findings 
have been largely superseded by our joint work. Thanks are due to David Landy (Irish Palestinian 
Solidarity Committee), Brian Bocking and Alicia Turner for comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. 
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native" and became actively involved in Asian anti-imperialist and anti-
missionary politics in Burma, Japan, Ceylon and the young Soviet Union.   
As Buddhists or Buddhist sympathisers, they were typically organisers and 
writers within Asian-led organisations, and in some cases played significant roles 
in the development of local anti-colonial cultural nationalisms, framed in 
religious and anti-missionary terms at a point when the relationship between 
Christian missionary activity in Asia and British imperial policy was at its height. 
This anti-colonial religious nationalism paralleled and, perhaps, drew on the 
experience of Irish Catholic nationalism. 
This paper attempts to understand something of this experience, situating it in the 
context of other kinds of anti-colonial and anti-racist solidarity of the period, and 
comparing it to contemporary international solidarity movements. In particular, 
it focusses on the unexpected relationship between one of the most effective of 
these activists, the anti-missionary polemicist, international Buddhist organiser 
and working-class Irishman U Dhammaloka, and plebeian freethinking (atheist) 
movements in the west. It situates this relationship in the complexities of radical 
anti-clericalism in Ireland, plebeian spiritualism and radical free-thought in 
Britain, America and Germany during this period, and the positioning of 
Buddhism as "a philosophy not a religion".  
The paper concludes by exploring the extent to which this politics represented an 
"alternative future" or utopianism, the limitations and collusions involved in these 
experiences, and what if anything can be learnt for the contemporary politics of 
international solidarity with radical religious movements in the majority world, 
from the role of Buddhism in dalit liberation struggles in India, anti-colonial 
politics in Tibet and democratic movements in Burma to the role of indigenous 
cultural nationalisms in North America, Mexico and the Andes. 
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Introduction 
In the opening year of the 20th century, a Buddhist monk issued a provocative 
declaration calling on Burmese people to rise up and resist the onslaught of 
missionary Christianity. Here, as elsewhere in Buddhist Asia, a cultural 
nationalism grounded in religious revival proved over the next half-century to be a 
very powerful tool in building movements of opposition to British imperial power 
in particular. The monk in question – whose religious name was U Dhammaloka – 
was in many ways a classic agitator; internationally connected and founding 
organisations across Southeast Asia, he held extensive speaking tours, distributed 
very large numbers of pamphlets, engaged in strategic confrontations with 
authority and on at least two occasions wound up in court. Reviled by missionaries 
and much of the colonial press, he was immensely popular among Asian plebeians 
in several countries. 
Dhammaloka, however, was not Burmese but Irish, probably of working-class 
background and certainly with years of "hoboing" in the US preceding his 
involvement in the Asian Buddhist revival; and the anti-Christianity of his 
Buddhist commitments was underpinned by a stream of connections with the 
European and North American freethinking (atheist) press. This paper discusses 
Dhammaloka along with a series of other, equally unlikely, turn-of-the-century 
Irish people whose solidarity and practical involvement with anti-colonial and 
cultural nationalist movements in Asia was mediated through Buddhism – as they 
understood or constructed it in the light of the politics of religion, culture and 
nationalism in Ireland. It asks how we can understand this peculiar form of 
international solidarity which linked (to misquote one Irish supporter of 
imperialism) "Britain's newest colonies with her oldest" (Ito 2003: 58), and what if 
anything we can learn from the experience today. 
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The politics of religion in Ireland 
The Irish Revolution of the late 19th and early 20th century provides a classic 
expression of Gramsci's insight that in some kinds of society the "war of position", 
the gradual conquest and remaking of class relations and the institutions of "civil 
society", must necessarily precede a successful "war of manoeuvre", the dramatic 
episodes of taking power within the state. The failure of the 1916 Rising, the partial 
success of the War of Independence (1919 – 1921), with its dual-power institutions, 
and the subsequent Civil War (1922 – 23), constituted one of only two successful 
independence movements in western Europe (the other being Norway, in 1905); as 
a result of this and earlier insurrectionary histories, Irish nationalists had 
considerable prestige among their international peers. 
The revolution's success rested above all on the successful displacement of 
aristocratic landlords by peasant ownership of farms, driven by the Land War of 
1880 – 1892, which transformed rural class relations; probably one of the few cases 
in which popular action has forced a non-revolutionary state into extinguishing a 
land-owning class. This transformation too was ambiguous; it rested on a shift 
towards commodity production at the long-term expense of subsistence farmers, 
and was politically allied to the development of national capital, backed by the 
church and state against the urban proletariat (most decisively in the 1913 Dublin 
Lockout), the first-wave women's movement, and landless labourers. 
This "war of position" was crucially linked to processes of ethno-religious 
sectarianism. Leaving aside the sectarian politics of Belfast in particular, which 
took a different form, the main form this took was the intensification of conflict 
between a declining Anglo-Irish imperial service class and a culturally conservative 
Catholic nationalism. The half-century following the devastating famine of 1845 – 
47 saw an intense investment in the (re-)construction of the Catholic church – 
subject to penal laws as recently as 50 years previously – as one of the main forms 
of popular organisation in Ireland, matched where possible by a revival of both 
Anglican and nonconformist churches (Nic Ghiolla Phádraig 1995). 
Although other elements of cultural nationalism – particularly in sports, language 
and high culture – were significant, there is little doubt but that religion was the 
dominant aspect of sharpening processes of ethnic identity construction, or that 
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these ethno-religious identities were linked to issues of class and nationality in 
particular. Religion, then, was the first language in which Irish people in this 
period spoke politics, from the micro-politics of sexuality to the macro-politics of 
states and institutions (Inglis 1998). 
These competing identities also had international ramifications: from the 
competing historical narratives told in religious-controlled schools, of triumphant 
British imperialism or betrayed Catholic nationalism, to identification and (for 
elites) future careers in the "two empires": the British empire, then at its global 
height, and with an army and civil service which both recruited heavily from 
Ireland, (Mac Éinrí 2006) and the developing "spiritual empire" of Irish Catholic 
institutions abroad, both among the Irish diaspora and in newly colonised 
countries. Plebeians could also make a career, for example as Catholic privates in 
the Army, but this made for more complex and (on occasion) contested narratives 
(Nagai 2006).   
 
Religious defection 
In this context, with the long-term writing on the wall for what had once been the 
Anglo-Irish (and hence Protestant) Ascendancy as aristocracy, as unquestioned 
state class and as supplier of officers and civil servants to the British Empire, it is 
unsurprising that some of its most creative offspring defected, in whole or in part, 
from a doomed caste, and equally unsurprising that they sought a resolution of 
their future in alternative religion.  
The most immediately available such religion was the universalist new religious 
movement of Theosophy, itself a response to the encounter with other civilisations 
mediated through empire (Franklin 2008). Through Theosophy such defectors 
could explore the possibility of setting aside an identity as Protestant or non-
conformist, in favour of an endless range of possibilities: identification with 
peasant folklore and with pre-Christian Celtic myth, with esoteric Christianity and 
with occultism, or with Indian religion, particularly Hinduism. 
Figures such as the writer and politician WB Yeats, the co-operative organiser and 
mystic AE (George Russell), and the novelist James Stephens all took this route, 
seeking an alternative way of positioning themselves in Irish politics and culture 
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after the end of empire. More importantly for our purposes, figures such as the 
writer James Cousins, his wife the suffragette Margaret, and the Fabian and 
feminist Annie Besant (who identified as Irish) moved to India and became closely 
involved in Indian nationalist politics via the "Hindu route" through Theosophy – 
as did, in parallel, Margaret Noble (Sister Nivedita), who also became an active 
Hindu nationalist2. Defection from an imperial caste, then, could result in anti-
imperial solidarity grounded in cultural nationalism3.  
While Irish Theosophy was certainly driven in the first instance by the search for a 
new religious identification from which to legitimate continued involvement in the 
politics of nation-states, the examples given above show that there were also other 
concerns, and other kinds of actors involved. Feminism, and women's search for 
religious legitimacy outside the space defined by conservative Christianity, was one 
of these strands (Singh 2006).  
Another, which we shall see surface more strongly in relation to Buddhism, was the 
inheritance of plebeian anti-clericalism and rationalist suspicion of Christianity, 
existing perhaps more as a flavour than a coherent position: yet AE the organiser of 
agricultural cooperatives (and mystic), Besant the Fabian (and Hindu) and 
Stephens, survivor of an industrial school and writer of philosophical novels, were 
all in their different ways working through some of these issues. 
 
                                                   
2 See Guinness (2003, 2004) on the politics of Theosophy in Ireland. 
3 David Landy notes that contemporary distant issue movements, which are less frequently 
contesting their own states' empires abroad, need not entail the same degree of defection; or 
perhaps we might want to distinguish between "safe" DIMs (which also existed in the 19th century, 
for example the campaign against suttee in India) and "dissident" ones.  
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Early Irish Buddhists, international organising and  
anti-imperial cultural nationalism  
These "Irish Theosophists" are well known for their contributions to Irish culture, 
and in some cases to Indian politics. Rather less well-known, but in some ways 
more interesting, are their counterparts who became Buddhist, or Buddhist 
sympathisers, in the same period. Unlike Theosophy, and its possible outlets in 
peasant folklore, Celtic myth and esoteric Christianity, Buddhism offered no public 
place to stand in late 19th or early 20th century Ireland – and although Buddhists 
appeared consistently (and anonymously) from the 1871 census on, the first Irish 
person to "out" themselves publicly as a Buddhist in Ireland was DA Marks in 1972, 
101 years later. 
Irish Buddhists of this period – the late 19th and early 20th century – are in this 
respect more similar to the "Hindu Theosophists", in that they "went native", 
crossing the lines of colonial power and racism which were intensely marked in 
imperial Asia during this period, and becoming actively involved in Asian anti-
imperialist and anti-missionary politics in Burma, Japan, Ceylon and the young 
Soviet Union. While we know (as yet) of no women who took this route, the Irish 
Buddhists were less uniformly Anglo-Irish, including both Catholic and plebeian 
backgrounds alongside Protestant and elite upbringings.  
They stand fairly straightforwardly within a broad Buddhist revival, or what has 
been called "Buddhist modernism" (MacMahan 2008), which – under the twin 
impact of imperialism and missionary activity – reformulated Buddhist practice in 
line with the needs of an emerging urban educated elite, developing forms of 
preaching, meditation, education and so on which enabled this remade Buddhism 
to act as a central force in anti-colonial national identity formation across Buddhist 
countries from Ceylon to Japan. 
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Dramatis personae 
A series of brief biographical sketches is helpful at this point4. The dates given are 
those of their Buddhist-related activity. It should be clear in what follows that we 
are not discussing a movement, but rather the careers of migrants who joined 
movements abroad on the basis of a particular shared identity. They are, almost by 
definition, extremely unusual both among Irish people of the day and among Asian 
cultural nationalists of the day; my contention in this paper however is that their 
experiences can tell us something interesting about both. 
 
Koizumi Yakumo / Lafcadio Hearn (1890 – 1904) 
Son of an Anglo-Irish military officer and a local Greek woman, Hearn was brought 
up in Dublin in ever-declining fortunes as both parents abandoned him and he was 
passed onto an aunt who had converted to Catholicism. As she lost her money to an 
adventurer, his prospects vanished and he was sent to seek his fortune in the US at 
the age of 17, where he became a journalist. Unsurprisingly, given these premises, 
his tastes were Gothic, and he made his name in New Orleans writing on local 
murders and on Creole culture.  
However, he had also encountered Fourierist and anarchist ideas in his first job, as 
a printer, and from the 1870s was attracted by Buddhism, to such a point that his 
journal was dubbed "the Infidel Sheet" by local clergy. His Louisana career was 
badly affected by his marriage to a black woman, and in 1890 an editor sent him to 
Japan, where he became an English teacher and eventually a university lecturer, 
married a Japanese woman and took up Japanese citizenship, being eventually 
given a Buddhist funeral. 
Koizumi Yakumo played a significant role in the development of Japanese cultural 
nationalism, following the forced opening of Japanese trade with the west in the 
1850s and the Meiji revolution of the 186os. His position as university lecturer 
                                                   
4 This account leaves out early Irish Buddhists in Asia without any apparent political interest of this 
kind, notably Captain C Pfoundes in Japan, an early eccentric and ethnographer who was initiated 
into various sects of Shingon (Tantric) Buddhism, and in Ladakh Lobsang Jivaka (Michael / Laura 
Dillon), the world's first female to male transsexual by plastic surgery. See Cox and Griffin 2009 for 
more references on Jivaka and on Kipling's fictional Kim.  
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located him as an imported moderniser, whose role was to help Japan catch up 
with the West; his particular contribution, however, was to use this prestige to 
defend the cultural world of "old Japan", particularly its peasant and Buddhist 
aspects in a context of imperial Shinto. In this his strategies were sharply opposed 
to the "New Buddhism" of the Meiji, which argued for a reconstructed and 
modernised Buddhism, in line with imperial policy. 
In this approach, he drew consciously on Yeats' romantic identification of the 
essence of a country or people with peasant folklore – a position mediated for both 
Koizumi and Yeats by a colonial context where their emotional identification with 
the places and images of their early years were contested by Catholic nationalists, 
leading them to look for a position from which they could be truly of a place, and a 
lifelong search for such identification. 
In terms of this role in the development of Japanese cultural nationalism, three 
things can be noted. One is the sharpness of Koizumi's "going native": adopting 
Japanese citizenship cost him a massive drop in salary and constant financial 
worries. If his previous marriage, to the illegitimate daughter of a slave, had caused 
scandal, he now consciously chose to avoid association with westerners in Japan, 
and again found himself on the far side of sharp racial boundaries. Secondly, his 
personal politics were sharply anti-imperialist in the context of the day: regarded 
by the British consul (himself Irish) as an extreme nationalist, he supported the 
Boers against the British and the Japanese against the Russians. Thirdly, his 
personal response to Buddhism was intellectually mediated above all by a prior 
commitment to agnosticism, and repeated attempts to synthesise his 
understanding of Herbert Spencer with his understanding of Buddhist theory and 
his love of Japanese folklore and landscape. 
 
John Bowles Daly (1889 – 95) 
John Bowles Daly had been trained as an Anglican clergyman and on his own 
account abandoned work in London's East End on finding that Christianity was not 
meeting the needs of those he worked with. He became a spiritualist, and 
eventually a Theosophist, while publishing a series of populist books from a liberal 
and free-thinking nationalist perspective – Radical pioneers, a collection of 
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hagiographies of Wilkes and other liberal activists; a collection of Swift's writings 
on Ireland; a set of lives of leaders of the 1798 uprising; and a plea for the 
development of Irish industry in opposition to what we would now call 
dependency. Never very strong on questions of agency, his writing was always 
primarily concerned with the question of modernisation through technical 
rationalisation – Ireland's, Ceylon's, or India's – willing to work either with 
movement organisations or to appeal to authority in this pursuit. 
In this context, Daly had a long-standing interest, for reasons which remain 
unclear, in Buddhist Ceylon and in particular in Buddhist education; and in 1889 
he travelled with the indefatigable Theosophist organiser Col. Olcott to Ceylon to 
help develop the Buddhist Theosophical Society schools. BTS schools were part of 
the modernising Buddhist nationalism of the day, counterposed both to the 
Christian mission schools, and to the traditionalist, temple schools run by village 
monks. As such, Daly was working above all with the new urban lay Sinhala 
Buddhists, who were developing their identity as the future national elite through 
this combination of modernisation and cultural nationalism.  
The details are somewhat unclear, but it seems that Daly reorganised the flagship 
Mahinda College in Galle and was its principal before resigning in conflict with 
Olcott and the Trustees over questions of discipline. This job evidently came 
against a broader backdrop of study and travel, in the course of which he claimed to 
have visited 1300 monasteries. Subsequently this expertise was employed by the 
colonial authorities when he was appointed commissioner and wrote a report on 
the disestablishment of monastic landholdings. It is not clear to what extent this 
represented a modernising position or the influence of missionary politics; around 
this time Daly moved to India, apparently defeated by the Ceylonese experience, 
which he does not refer to in later writings, where he also seems to have reverted to 
a broader mysticism, Theosophist in content but critical of the Society. 
 
Maurice Collis (1912 – 1934) 
Similarly to Koizumi Yakumo, the Anglo-Irish civil servant and writer Maurice 
Collis transposed a Yeats-inflected emotional identification with the Irish 
landscape and folklore to a love for the magical aspects of Burmese Buddhism. His 
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political evolution, however, was very different. Starting with what he subsequently 
admitted was a naïve belief in the beneficence of empire, his work as a magistrate 
in Burma (whose conquest had only been completed in 1885) led him to a sharp 
critique of its daily reality, an understanding of its purpose of economic 
exploitation and a series of increasingly difficult choices. 
Introduced by his friend the Orientalist Gordon Luce to the modernising 
nationalists of the Burmese middle class, and shocked by Luce's own ostracisation 
by westerners for marrying a Burmese woman, Collis was treated as a sympathetic 
magistrate by Buddhist authorities, who suspended the normal rules (aimed at 
police and military tourists) barring the wearing of shoes at pagodas – an 
experience which left him personally deeply uncomfortable and feeling like an 
intruder. 
In 1929 and 1930, two rulings – the first criticising a white employer whose 
bullying had led to a servant's suicide, the second jailing an officer who caused a 
traffic accident injuring two Burmese women – led to an outcry among the colonial 
community and his removal to increasingly trivial posts, eventually forcing his 
resignation. 
Politically, the war of independence and the atrocities of the Black and Tans had 
turned Collis into a sympathiser with Irish nationalism, and he had no difficulty in 
seeing the parallels with Burma. In his view British policy had made a home rule 
settlement for Ireland (and hence the continuation of the world he had come from) 
impossible, and he hoped – increasingly in vain – that this could be avoided in 
Burma. 
Collis' response to Saya San's uprising (1930 – 32) is worth quoting at length as an 
illustration of how he saw Burma through Irish spectacles5: 
All the Burmese one had met in Rangoon, the members of parliament, the bar and the 
professional class, pinned their faith on the grant of a new constitution and were as much 
surprised as was the government. It was a magical rebellion. The old Burma which I have 
described, the Burma that dreamed of a saviour king, believed that a saviour king had come… 
                                                   
5 Alicia Turner notes that Collis is here following the projections of the colonial state in picturing 
Saya San as magical and millennial, and that he was in fact far more political and bureaucratic than 
Collis gives him credit for.  
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There was a confluence of all the visionaries. The mediums gathered and were possessed by the 
spirits; the spirits spoke through them and promised victory. The alchemists prepared the elixir, 
the magicians were at hand with their magic diagrams. The hosts of fairyland were besought for 
help, the divinities of tree and stream and hill, those who resided in stones and old sites, the 
guardian ghosts, and those of paradise, the superior spirits, the King of Heaven himself. All these 
sweet fairies among whose haunts I had been wandering nearly twenty years were now 
summoned with music and dancing, aroused with offerings of fruit and flowers, adjured with 
incantatory verse… (1953: 192 – 3)  
Collis' own politics, naturally, remained resolutely rational; despite his love for 
Burmese culture and folklore, he was clear that the future lay with the urban, 
educated, constitutional nationalists. In 1931, home on leave, he brokered private 
meetings between a Burmese nationalist delegation and leading Irish nationalists – 
the Treaty signatory Robert Barton, the extreme nationalist Maud Gonne McBride 
(who told the Burmese to get everything in writing when dealing with the British) 
and AE, mentioned above. By 1934 Collis had been forced out of Burma, and spent 
much of the rest of his life as a (very accomplished) writer, focussing among other 
things on the Asian encounter with European colonisers. 
 
Patrick Breslin (1920s – 1930s) 
Very much "from the other side" in terms of background, Patrick Breslin holds the 
unenviable distinction of being one of only three Irish people to fall victim to 
Stalin's purges6. As a leading young leftist of petty-bourgeois Catholic origins, he 
was a member of the first Communist Party of Ireland and its successor 
organisations, the Workers' Party of Ireland and the Irish Worker League and an 
associate of James Connolly's son Roddy and the revolutionary military strategist 
Jack White.  
Breslin, however, had also been a regular attender at Theosophist meetings and an 
associate of the astrologer and Theosophist Cyril Fagan. He had rejected 
Catholicism at the age of 14 and seriously considered the propositions of "Indian 
mysticism" (presumably as mediated by Theosophy) before rejecting them. Sent by 
James Larkin to the International Lenin School in Moscow, Breslin defended 
spiritualism and the materialist character of "materialisations". This, however, was 
                                                   
6 Most of the information in this section is drawn from McLoughlin 2007. 
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not the grounds for his purging (at a later point, the criminal psychologists who 
examined him as a prisoner noted that his positions were "concrete, real and in line 
with the views expressed in the literature on these matters"). 
Purged from the party and the ILS for his petty-bourgeois origins and 
independence of thought (he later suffered from alcoholism), Breslin remained in 
the Soviet Union as a journalist and translator for Soviet papers. His first wife 
Katya had had a mystical experience while visiting the Buddhist temple in St 
Petersburg as a teenager7, and family history records that Breslin shared this 
interest, which fits with his spiritualism and exploration of Theosophy . Her 
interest, however, also led her to become a translator of Japanese, and hence 
politically suspect; his purging followed hers, and he died in transit to a labour 
camp in 1942. 
 
U Dhammaloka / Lawrence O'Rourke (1880s? – 1911?) 
I will discuss U Dhammaloka in more detail below; here I want to note simply the 
points that are relevant as comparisons to the other early Irish Buddhists involved 
in Asian cultural nationalism or anti-imperialist work. He was probably born 
Lawrence O'Rourke in Dublin in the second half of the 1850s, in a working-class or 
declining artisanal family; as a young man he emigrated to the US, holding a series 
of transient manual jobs in between living as a hobo. After perhaps two decades of 
this he worked his way from the West Coast to Asia, winding up in Burma, where 
he converted to Buddhism and ordained under the name of Dhammaloka, 
somewhere in the late 1880s or 1890s. 
From a point somewhere in the 1890s, Dhammaloka started to become an 
increasingly public figure, as a touring preacher and polemicist against Christian 
missionaries, as founder of Buddhist organisations in Burma, Singapore and Siam 
and networker with Buddhists in India, Nepal, Ceylon and Japan, and as an 
energetic writer and self-publicist, publishing Buddhist tracts, engaging in 
                                                   
7 This had been founded by the Lithuanian Buddhist Karl Tennisons, whose Buddhist commitments 
won him the support of the 13th Dalai Lama. This was presumably instrumental in gaining the 
allegiance of the migrant Buryats and Kalmyks, Siberian minorities who had been converted to 
Buddhism by (Gelugpa) Mongolian Buddhists. 
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newspaper controversy and in correspondence with Germany, the US, Canada and 
Britain. 
Dhammaloka's take on Buddhism was very much as "rational religion": as Asian 
culture in opposition to western and to Christian missionaries in particular, and as 
strongly associated with temperance. In particular, his tracts included the works of 
Thomas Paine and other rationalist critiques of Christianity, and his western 
correspondents were virtually without exception free-thought publications. 
 
Individuals in solidarity movements 
In noting these five individuals, it should be clear that I am in no sense proposing 
"Irish Buddhism" as a social movement in this period, and I am not  primarily 
interested in the contribution these individuals made to cultural nationalism or 
anti-imperialism in their adopted countries – a contribution which was relatively 
significant in the case of Koizumi Yakumo and U Dhammaloka, but non-trivial in 
the other three cases. Rather, I am interested in what these examples tell us about 
the nature of international solidarity in this context, where cultural nationalism 
and anti-imperialism in Ireland were mirrored in Buddhist Asia by an international 
Buddhist Revival, driven by both Western and Asian organisations – and in 
contexts where the prospects for the success of either, and the attraction of 
collusion with empire, varied hugely. 
Firstly, these figures were to varying degrees "going native" in a world marked by 
sharp divisions of race and culture and by imperial power. Koizumi married a 
Japanese woman and Breslin a Russian (his second wife was Irish); Dhammaloka 
took monastic vows, while Collis sabotaged his own career by associating with 
Burmese and refusing to treat whites and Asians differently as a judge (Daly is an 
exception). Equally or more importantly, they were primarily located within and 
dependent on Asian-led organisations, as varied as the Buddhist sangha and 
nationalist benefactors (Dhammaloka), a range of Soviet institutions (Breslin), the 
Buddhist Theosophical Society (Daly), and Japanese schools and universities 
(Koizumi) – but all fitting within the general rubric of developmental nationalism. 
Collis is the only one primarily dependent on western or colonial institutions.  
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Their political activities obviously varied hugely, from Collis' personal acts of 
solidarity via Breslin's somewhat lackadaisical journalism to Koizumi and 
Dhammaloka's much more effective publicistic activity and to Daly and 
Dhammaloka's organisation-building. So too did their political perspectives taken 
on their own terms, in a scale running from Daly's technocratic modernism via 
Collis' liberal nationalism and Dhammaloka's pan-Asian cultural revivalism to 
Koizumi's visceral anti-imperialism and Breslin's communism.   
Thirdly, there was an important nexus between their own religious evolution and 
cultural nationalisms in Asia. Daly, Koizumi, Breslin and Dhammaloka all shared 
an early rejection of Christianity along free-thinking, agnostic and / or spiritualist 
lines, not as independent personal decisions but as mediated through spiritualist 
and theosophical societies, free-thinking and anarchist organisations. (Collis' 
personal evolution is unclear in this respect.) In Asia, the choice of developing or 
deepening an interest in Buddhism led them into alliance with the cultural 
nationalisms of Ceylon, Burma and Japan (this was clearly not true for Breslin).  
These cultural nationalisms – like the institutions of the Soviet state for Breslin – 
represent key ways in which newly hegemonic developmentalist nationalisms (the 
Soviet and Meiji states) and would-be hegemonic nationalist elites (in Burma and 
Ceylon) set out to conquer or remake "civil society", in opposition – as far as our 
Irish Buddhists are concerned – to missionary Christianity. It should be noted that 
this period saw the traditional "hands-off" approach of the Indian Civil Service, 
which preferred to work through comprador elites and leave native religion, law 
and custom to itself as far as possible, increasingly challenged by the need to 
mobilise popular support for empire and hence its legitimation through 
Christianity.  
These experiences were old in Ireland, which had undergone the reverse evolution 
in colonial policy, from the failure of penal legislation and attempts to convert 
Catholics to the modus vivendi reached between the Church and the colonial 
administration, which saw effective control over the schooling and health care of 
Catholics increasingly handed over to religious institutions – a model often 
preferred by Irish administrators such as William Gregory in Ceylon or Justice 
Twomey in Burma. 
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Conversely, the use of cultural nationalism, and specifically the articulation of 
ethnic identity around religion in an implicit opposition to imperial power which 
had the merit of being largely immune from direct attack in the 19th and 20th 
century context, was by now a central part of Irish life, in particular since the 
success of Daniel O'Connell's emancipation movement in the first half of the 19th 
century; and I think there is a case to be made that these Irish Buddhists were 
importing something of their own "tacit knowledge" in support of those Buddhist 
revivalists who were pursuing the same strategy. Not, obviously, that Asians 
needed someone else to suggest the idea that religion could provide an effective 
strategy for organising nationalist movements, any more than the Irish had earlier; 
but rather that Irish Buddhists found this a particularly easy link to make, and – 
particularly in the cases of Dhammaloka and Koizumi – did so at an early point 
with great confidence that was itself helpful. 
Another and broader way of putting the general case is to suggest that the 
increased pro-imperial involvement of metropolitan populations via support for 
missionary activity in colonial Asia (an involvement in which Irish people were of 
course active in very large numbers) also called forth an anti-colonial religious 
nationalism which could hardly have been effective had religion not become a 
central legitimating part of colonisation. The move from a freethinking, spiritualist, 
anti-clerical or socialist identity in Ireland – in opposition to both dominant forms 
of Christianity – became a Buddhist or Buddhist-sympathising one in Asia, in 
response to the colonial form of Christianity and in solidarity with Asian Buddhists. 
In pursuing these strategies – more or less successfully – Irish Buddhists were also 
connecting with the central, ethno-religious issue of Irish politics. 
Finally, the various kinds of anti-colonial and anti-racist solidarity of the period 
come out nicely in the various kinds of organisations which mediated these Irish 
Buddhists' activity. The Comintern, which brought Patrick Breslin to Moscow, is at 
one extreme as a conscious organisation of international anti-imperial solidarity 
(and of course many other things besides). Maurice Collis' connection-making 
between (by then successful) Irish nationalist revolutionaries and Burmese 
nationalists is a less formal type of interaction between nationalisms, albeit one 
more common in the history of relations between Ireland and India (ref.)  
 16 
The Buddhist Theosophical Society which employed John Bowles Daly was a local 
inflection of a supposedly universal religious organisation which did become a 
major actor at one point in Indian as in Irish or Ceylonese politics. Such 
organisations – whether initiated from the West, Asian-based such as Anagarika 
Dharmapala's Maha Bodhi Society or founded by westerners in Asia such as 
Ananda Metteyya's Buddhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland (founded to carry 
out missionary activity in reverse) – were a key part of the Buddhist Revival 
(McMahan 2008).  
On a less centralised basis again, Buddhist organisations mirroring Christian 
missionary ones were a staple of the Asian scene, often with few or no 
interconnections; in this category fall bodies such as U Dhammaloka's "Buddhist 
Tract Society", Young Men's Buddhist Associations and the like. Because of their 
largely independent origins, they pursued very different politics – the Ceylonese 
YMBAs were anti-Christian, whereas the Burmese organisation may even have 
been founded by a Christian (Alicia Turner, pers. comm.) At times there were 
bilateral relationships, such as between Ceylon and Burma, which drew on prior 
interactions between the monastic sanghas, and attempts, often based in Japan, to 
assert a general hegemony over Buddhist activity in Asia; but these networks rarely 
seem to have been particularly effective. 
Finally, the equivalents of anti-racist activity in this period often took the form 
simply of asserting that "natives" represented a high level of "civilisation", asserting 
the validity of their religion as against that of the west, breaching boundaries 
through marriage or friendship (becoming "pro-Burman" in the worst charge 
levelled against Maurice Collis), or genuinely acting – for example in a court of law 
– on the proposition of formal equality.  
Contemporary international solidarity movements of course continue to explore 
these different models, and often with equally erratic success, not least because of 
the inherent challenge of "distant issue movements" (Landy 2009). There are some 
notable differences: the direct calquing of organisations on others has become rarer 
(though the World Social Forum is a notable exception), perhaps because the 
lesson of how to organise in modernity really only needs to be learned once in its 
broadest outlines. The relatively straightforward models of earlier anti-imperialist 
internationalism, still evident in e.g. Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement, 
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have been shaped by the uneven history of national and socialist liberation 
movements – and even more so the history of those states after independence – to 
produce a more varied organising terrain. In this new world, "one-size-fits-all" 
organising models are perhaps at a bit more of a discount, and those which are 
geared to "an ecology of knowledges" (de Sousa Santos 2006) are probably doing 
rather better. In general, however, the world these organisers occupied is 
recognisably the same as ours in practical terms. 
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U Dhammaloka and plebeian freethought 
In this next section, I want to focus on one of the more unexpected aspects of these 
international relationships, that between Irish Buddhists and Buddhist 
sympathisers in Asia, and agnosticism, free thought (atheism) and spiritualism in 
the west. Koizumi moved from atheist influence through agnosticism towards 
Buddhist sympathies; Daly from spiritualism to Theosophical Buddhism and back 
towards mysticism; Breslin from spiritualism to Buddhist sympathies; and 
Dhammaloka consistently attempted to combine free thought and Buddhism8.  
This combination seems paradoxical, but as Logie Barrow (1986) shows, in this 
period in England at least, spiritualism was as frequently a plebeian option, seeing 
itself as scientific and opposed to religion, as it was the more aristocratic option 
which (in England) tended towards an alternative religion and ultimately towards 
Theosophy. If it has often been said of "Protestant Buddhism" – the jointly 
constructed Buddhism of Theravada modernisers and British Orientalists – that it 
argued for a rational religion which promised morality without God, then plebeian 
spiritualism argued (in Barrow's words) for a democratic epistemology in which 
everyone could have access to the afterlife without Christianity or mystery. In this 
latter manifestation, spiritualism was an ally of free thought and not its enemy, 
strange though this seems over a century on; and the anti-Christianity and political 
radicalism of plebeian free thought made it an important "nursery culture" for 
working-class Liberalism and, later, socialism (Barrow 1986). 
I want to explore some of these encounters with relation to U Dhammaloka in 
particular. In essence, there are three aspects of this Buddhist-atheist relationship 
worth noting. Firstly, his known discourses as a Buddhist polemicist in Asia are 
above all anti-missionary discourses in which the dominant tone is an anti-
Christianity derived from aggressively rationalist western sources. Secondly, he was 
in mutually supportive correspondence with, and noted by, American, German and 
British free-thought periodicals. Thirdly, while most of this is likely to be traceable 
                                                   
8 I have not yet been able to establish Collis' personal background in these matters, but from the 
tone he would seem to be simultaneously sceptical of religion and attracted by it – wishing, as 
Thomas Hardy said, "that it might be so". So far I have found no evidence, however, of interest in 
any organised form of religion or anti-religion. 
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to his American years, it seems plausible that elements of the anti-clericalist tone 
have plebeian, Irish Catholic roots.  
The net effect, I want to argue, was to make a connection between the Asian 
Buddhist revival – in Dhammaloka's hands, rationalist and modernising, 
confrontational and anti-missionary, mass-mobilisation and distinctly 
"unrespectable" – with comparable elements in western free thought, as mediated 
through his own, working-class Irish, take on these matters. I will start from 
Dhammaloka's end. 
 
Organising against Christianity 
The bulk of commentary on Dhammaloka by missionaries and the English-
language papers of "the colonial community" in Asia is unremittingly negative, 
revolving around three interrelated criticisms. Dhammaloka was criticised for not 
being a gentleman in his behaviour or his education; for his antagonistic 
relationship to Christianity; and for being Irish. No doubt he would have pleaded 
guilty to all charges.  
As noted, his background was working-class or declining artisan, with perhaps two 
decades of life as a travelling and intermittently employed manual labourer 
preceding his becoming a Buddhist monk. He was clearly self-educated, but 
effectively so for his own purposes – if he was unable to sustain a single argument 
at book length, he was more than capable of defeating missionaries in debate and 
of delivering short, powerful speeches and pamphlets. This self-education was 
characteristic of many working men of the period in the UK as a whole, and 
remains a strong characteristic of working-class Irish culture. Elsewhere (Cox 
2009) I have noted the parallel between Dhammaloka's working life and James 
Connolly's in terms of employment; the two were rough contemporaries. 
Dhammaloka's lack of suitable gentility, which went together with an ability to 
make friends in the most unlikely places and across languages and countries, was 
very much bound up with an Irish persona – and accent, which commentators 
made much of. Along with his class and education, it marks him out as distinctly 
unrespectable, even before his adoption of monastic rules which set him further 
apart from the social norms of colonists in Asia. 
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This lack of respectability combined with an antagonistic relationship to 
Christianity which – in the eyes of the same commentators – distinguished him 
sharply from genteel western Buddhists such as his contemporary in Burma, 
Ananda Metteyya (Allan Bennett), who treated Buddhism above all as philosophy 
and sought rather to introduce it to educated people in the west rather than use it 
"to hurl the little streets against the great", as Yeats put it.  By all accounts, 
Dhammaloka's language was inflammatory, and this proved the basis for two 
charges of sedition, the second of which was successful and was upheld on appeal. 
We can note here the occasion of the first (unsuccessful) sedition charge, which 
arose out of a confrontation between Dhammaloka (who as far as we know had no 
personal role as pagoda trustee) and a police officer who insisted on visiting a 
pagoda while wearing his shoes. Here Dhammaloka positioned himself, 
dramatically and publicly, as defender of local Buddhist purity against (Indian) 
disrespect, and seems to have become very popular as a result.  
More generally, there seems to have been much missionary and newspaper concern 
that he was disturbing the simple faith of the Burmese and turning it into 
something it was not supposed to be, a source of tensions with Christian 
missionaries and – behind the missionaries – empire. His was not Collis' uprising 
of the fairies and the fortune-tellers, but something potentially much more 
dangerous: an urban, ethnically-based mass movement. 
David Landy suggests the useful concept of "constructive misrecognition": that 
western freethinkers and Buddhist revivalists (like some radical Islamists and their 
western supporters today) found it strategically useful to misunderstand, or 
misrepresent, each other in the pursuit of local aims which are politically 
compatible even if ideologically incompatible; and there may indeed be aspects of 
this. I would rather suggest, however, that Buddhism could plausibly be 
constructed as atheist; that many Asians (most powerfully perhaps the dalit leader 
BR Ambedkar) did precisely that; and that the alliance with western freethinkers 
and progressives more broadly was part of this process.  
To move to the mass aspect of things: Dhammaloka, as noted, was an effective 
organisation-builder in Burma and Singapore at least, was associated with 
organisation-building in Japan and had links with Siam, India, Nepal and perhaps 
Ceylon. Much of this was presumably facilitated by the revival of international links 
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between Buddhist sanghas, and by the development of other international bodies 
such as the Maha Bodhi society, Ananda Metteyya's organisations for bringing 
Buddhism to the west, and perhaps the Theosophical Society. 
One of his main concerns was publication, typically in English and in relatively 
short forms: brief tracts and declarations, the texts of speeches and letters to the 
newspapers. Along with these, he republished (in some cases with extensive 
editorial additions) a range of free-thinking texts under the aegis of his Buddhist 
Tract Society – texts which were usually notable for their stinging attacks on 
Christianity but rarely if ever related to Buddhism. Printing, and even more so 
distribution, of written material remains an important organisational challenge for 
social movements today, and the scope of the operation must remain somewhat in 
doubt, but it seems that we are talking about print runs in the thousands, and 
sometimes the tens of thousands, at least for the shorter works. 
An interesting and as yet unanswered question arises in relation to linguistic 
issues. Dhammaloka was clearly able to make himself understood in a number of 
Asian languages, but when giving a formal speech or writing expressed himself in 
English. On one occasion we have a record of interpreters (perhaps the same 
people who appear as distributing his tracts in other accounts). While urban 
educated Burmese people spoke and read English by this stage (and Dhammaloka 
had privileged relationships with one such newspaper editor), his natural audience 
clearly did not. This does not seem to have stopped him being popular in rural 
areas and among social groups who are unlikely to have had any significant level of 
English; but it may perhaps account in part for the ultimate failure of his 
organising efforts, if he was unable to have more than basic conversations in 
person with his natural constituency, and had to rely on educated assistants for 
campaigning purposes. 
Alicia Turner notes that until recently monks had preached in Pali or a Burmese-
Pali hybrid that would have been largely incomprehensible to mass audiences; in 
this context it was the fact of hearing the words that produced merit and reinforced 
social cohesion. In other words, particularly in rural areas, understanding the 
preaching may have been less important than the fact of seeing a white man in 
robes. This fits with David Landy's broader suggestion that Dhammaloka's 
whiteness would have been a boon in bringing the mystique of the more powerful 
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culture but converting and hence showing the inherent superiority of Buddhism. 
Both points seem valid, but it should be noted that educated colonials noted above 
all his Irishness and plebeian qualities – the fact that he was "not a gentleman". 
Unlike (say) Col. Olcott, whose status and prestige was considerable, 
Dhammaloka's prestige was only really plausible to those relatively low down the 
social scale; and as far as we know he never highlighted his whiteness or the 
significance of his conversion in this way. 
 
Western allies 
The link both to organised free-thought in the west and to the Irish anti-clerical 
heritage can be neatly illustrated through two letters Dhammaloka wrote to the 
editor of the Blue-Grass Blade in 1909. The Blue-Grass Blade (1884 – 1910) was a 
leading radical and free-thought publication based in Kentucky, whose editor was 
twice imprisoned for blasphemy, being released the second time on foot of a 
presidential pardon. In writing to the Blade, Dhammaloka wrote 
I was wondering how you got my address, as I did not think that we 'heathens' in far-off Burma 
should attract attention from any person of intelligence, except the 'holy and sanctified' Christian 
missionary. 
In his second letter he comments 
You ask if there are 2,000 admirers of Thomas Paine in Burma. Yes, and double as many. There 
were sold in Burma over 10,000 copies of the "Age of Reason" last year, as well as some copies of 
the "Rights of Man". 
I trust this year that we shall do better than last year. You will convey the greetings of ten 
millions of Buddhists of this province to your Association on the occasion of the great celebration 
of that grand Hero of Freethought. I am making the necessary arrangements to celebrate the 
occasion on a grand scale… 
We have not translated any parts of the "Age of Reason" as yet, but our Society intends to do this 
work next year, and you shall receive a copy of the same. We are going to bring it out in three 
parts, and if the funds permit we shall bring it out in full. 
I am sure that every friend of Truth will agree with me that it is time that we should show the 
bigots and the ministers of every church that Thomas Paine was the real friend of man – in fact, 
we can call him a Humanitarian of the loftiest type. 
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Tom Paine was an obvious point of reference for a Catholic-born freethinker in 
Ireland, and had been for over a hundred years; the Rights of Man had circulated 
widely between 1791 and the 1798 rebellion (Barnard 1999: 62), while in 1825 the 
Presbyterian moderator commented that "the works of Tom Paine … were put into 
the hands of the people. Paine's Rights of man, a political work, and Age of reason, 
a 'deistical' one, were 'industriously circulated'… 'not a few of the schoolmasters 
were men of bad principles, who preferred any book to the Bible' " (MacManus 
2002: 36). Paine was thus a traditional point of reference for Catholic anti-
clericalism. 
The Blue-grass blade was one of several western free-thinking journals which 
either noted Dhammaloka's views and comments approvingly, or with which he 
was in communication. Unlike the best-known western Buddhists in Asia, however, 
whose orientation (like Ananda Metteyya's) was always primarily the conversion of 
westerners in Europe and North America to Buddhism, Dhammaloka's main 
organising efforts were in Asia, and his main concern seems to have been to source 
arguments and texts for his anti-missionary polemics – a particularly important 
concern given his own limited formal education. 
These were the declining years of spiritualism and free-thought as plebeian and 
radical forms of organisation; the rise of socialist organising forms and the general 
secularisation of everyday life in many metropolitan societies took the urgency out 
of atheism as a political position, and increasingly tended to relegate it to a 
preoccupation of liberals such as Bertrand Russell (2004) and among the middle 
classes where religious belief and practice remained more significant (McLeod 
1997) There were important exceptions to this, of course, notably in anarchism and 
among European émigré communities in the US (Avrich 2006), where the Modern 
School movement was about to make a significant impact. In Ireland, by contrast, 
religious sectarianism dominated to the extent that even a Marxist like James 
Connolly had to distinguish carefully between (acceptable) anti-clericalism and 
(unacceptable) atheism and anti-Christianity, which in the anti-colonial context 
would have been the death knell of any form of socialist organising. 
There were, then, a variety of limitations to Dhammaloka's activities – the tension 
between his apparent dependence on urban, educated elites for finance, 
distribution and interpreting and his orientation to a broader, more plebeian and 
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less radical audience, and the gradual decline of atheism and spiritualism as 
important aspects of working-class culture, as well as his own personal quirks and 
difficulties. Nevertheless I want to suggest that – either measured on the scale of 
international solidarity movements or on that of immigrants in nationalist 
movements – he did not do so badly, and that the kind of history he exemplifies 
deserves greater attention. 
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Conclusion:  
implications for Buddhist solidarity movements today 
In conclusion, I want to ask what if anything can be learnt from this experience of 
early Irish Buddhist solidarity with the Asian Buddhist revival for the 
contemporary politics of international solidarity with radical religious movements 
in the majority world, and to what extent an "alternative future" can be glimpsed in 
this politics. 
There is of course a direct legacy, still active today, of the role of Buddhism in anti-
colonial and cultural nationalist movements in Asia. This legacy is not always a 
positive one, most visibly in Sri Lanka, though we could also mention Buddhist 
involvement in Japanese imperialism (Victoria 2006) and the sponsoring of 
Buddhist fundamentalism among Chinese Malays in the 1950s counter-insurgency. 
More generally, Buddhism in Asia is often (though not always) a form of popular 
self-organisation available for what recent authors (Queen and King 1996) have 
called "Buddhist liberation movements in Asia", in a range of very different 
contexts running from anti-colonial politics in Tibet via pro-democracy movements 
in Burma to dalit liberation struggles in India. 
Buddhism is of course not the only religion with such a history, but it is one of 
relatively few cases where (a) radical religious organising in the majority world (b) 
benefits from conscious international solidarity (c) from those who are not fellow-
believers (d) on specifically religious grounds. Most solidarity, for example US 
Christian support of Jews, international Muslim solidarity or western Left 
solidarity with popular movements in the Arab world, is either on the grounds of 
religious similarity / identity or despite sharp religious differences. In the case of 
Buddhism, there is often positive support for Buddhism per se among those who 
are in no sense Buddhist personally. 
The other category for which this is particularly important is indigenous religion, 
notably in the Americas, where four decades of increased self-assertion in the USA, 
Canada, Mexico and the Andean countries in particular has led to significant 
involvement of indigenous religion in radical political movements of various kinds, 
together with differing kinds of international solidarity for this ethnoreligious 
formation (as well of course as solidarity based on other factors). In both cases, of 
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course, we are talking of groups which are sufficiently weak "at home" for 
international solidarity to play a significant role. 
In many such cases the perception that the "distant" religion – indigenous or 
Buddhist – is not religious (or at least, not religious in the same way as "near" 
religions are) plays an important role, enabling solidarity between groups defined 
by an ethno-religious identity and distant supporters who share neither the religion 
nor the ethnicity. Such alliances can be based, for example, on Western perceptions 
of Buddhism as "more a philosophy than a religion", or of indigenous religion as 
mystical environmentalism – "seeing the mountain as sacred" and so on. 
These perceptions – of the "other's" religion as not religious in the same way and 
thus a reasonable basis for solidarity from those who do not share it – are harder to 
achieve for Christian, Muslim or to some extent Hindu-based movements, where 
solidarity has to take different forms and languages9 - sympathy based on shared 
religious propositions, or solidarity despite difference. Westerners in solidarity 
with Buddhist and indigenous groups can often express a solidarity which 
celebrates difference. 
It is also, of course, important that Buddhist and indigenous religious identities – 
or at least their public expression – have long been shaped in this kind of 
international dialogue, along with the (re-)encounter between different Buddhist 
countries that helped shape Buddhist modernism, or the organising efforts of 
networks of indigenous peoples across the Americas. The role of "the west" is clear, 
for example, in the evolution of the Dalai Lama's thought towards environmental 
themes and the renunciation of claims to re-establish theocratic rule in Tibet; in 
Aung San Suu Kyi's very modernist view of Buddhism; in the formation of BR 
Ambedkar's thought; or in Subcomandante Marcos' articulation of Zapatista 
thinking and the language of Evo Morales' forthcoming "People's world conference 
on climate change and the rights of mother earth": these are all ways of speaking 
which articulate a form of ethno-religious identity which is both progressive and 
acceptable to potential international supporters. 
                                                   
9 It is of course the case that Abrahamic religions share family resemblances, so that it is a more 
complex proposition to have two different yardsticks for evaluating such religions "at home" and 
"over there". 
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This point is often put as critique, in arguing that this makes what is being said 
unauthentic, or (worse) deceptive. This argument is sometimes valid, but (I want to 
suggest) not on the grounds of what a religion (or indeed religion as such) 
essentially "is", rather in terms of the way it is practically organised on the ground. 
In the situations discussed here, which are not those of uncritical long-distance 
support for states or powerful nationalisms against other similar actors, but of 
movements which are relatively weak within the international order, the 
implication is rather that the need for external solidarity from comparable 
movements abroad pushes them to stress the generally progressive character of 
these identities, and to organise themselves in those terms.   
As with the dialogue between plebeian freethought and anti-colonial movements, 
this is not necessarily a bad thing, as is often assumed. It may be particularly 
significant, as in the case discussed here, of the formation of a new oppositional 
movement, which then stands in particular need not only of allies but also of 
organising models, a language to articulate and a vision of the future society it 
seeks. Where these come from is not an irrelevant question: in this case the 
interaction becomes constitutive of the new movement (see Lopéz 1998 for a 
nuanced analysis of this in relation to Tibetan Buddhism post-1959).  
 
Coda 
Finally, what kind of utopia or "alternative future" is expressed by these processes, 
and what are its limits and collusions? 
There are of course particular themes which are often stressed in specific processes 
of this kind. Buddhism (for example in relation to China) is often said to be 
inherently pacifist, while indigenous cultures are often said to be inherently 
ecological (some are also claimed to embody gender equality).  
More generally, however, I think there are three themes worth noting in 
contemporary solidarity relationships with movements of this kind. The first is the 
question of difference, touched on earlier. If it is important for such movements to 
frame ethno-religious identity in terms which are comprehensible by western 
supporters, it is not necessary for them to attempt conversion. More strongly, as we 
have seen, part of the attraction specific to Buddhism and indigenous religions is 
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the belief that they are not comparable to "religion as we know it". Thus 
underpinning this kind of solidarity is a sense of diversity-with-equality: that it is 
possible (say) to be deeply moved by the actions of Burmese monks without 
wanting to be one, and to contrast Buddhism (as constructed in this process) 
positively with western religion from a standpoint of agnosticism, or religious 
universalism of the Theosophical kind. Part of the utopia, then, is that other people 
have distinct and worthwhile ways of living and feeling which need not be shared to 
be valued and supported. 
Secondly, this process pushes towards the articulation of a language of human 
needs of a surprisingly universalist kind10. Thus Buddhist rhetorics in this context 
speak of non-violence and peace, of compassion and loving-kindness, of truth and 
simplicity, while indigenous rhetorics often stress knowledge of and respect for 
place, landscape and nature and position speakers and hearers as emotional, 
embodied and in community. 
These positives, of course, are also expressed through the contrast with state 
repression and propaganda and with capitalist industrialisation, individualisation 
and alienation, and this is my third theme. While these solidarity processes remain 
relationships between popular movements, they highlight shared experiences of 
capitalism and state power, and position as utopia a different world – even where, 
as often, the practical strategies revolve around attaining a different kind of 
capitalist state. 
This last point marks one kind of limit to this process, as does in a broader sense 
the practical fact of religion as a marker of ethnic identity. There are also, I think, 
limitations in the use of religious language itself, as tending often to foreclose 
broader questions of strategy and analysis. As with our nineteenth- and twentieth-
century Irish Buddhists, international solidarity with anti-colonial movements 
defined by ethno-religious identity is relatively good at organising people to resist 
colonisation and empire; it is relatively weak at developing alternatives that are not 
capitalist nation states. 
                                                   
10 Universalisms are not necessarily rationalisms, it should be noted: the language of defending 
someone's right to vote for someone you dislike, to practice a religion you find distasteful, or to 
speak a language you do not understand is a rather different matter from the argument that "all 
religions are really one", of which Theosophy was a powerful carrier. 
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Here, of course, it becomes of interest to return to Patrick Breslin and non-religious 
forms of solidarity, and in the present to the Zapatistas, and non-capitalist, non-
state ways of articulating strategy. As in very different ways with Dhammaloka's 
use of Buddhism to articulate and act on his radical atheism, the encounter 
between indigenous ways of speaking and acting and the Marxist inheritance in the 
EZLN is a fascinating and productive encounter. 
This history has of course not reached its end; the capacity of any actors to sustain 
popular forms of anti-imperial or anti-colonial solidarity (as opposed to states 
assisting the internal opponents of enemy states, which has a far longer history), 
whether on a religious, nationalist, socialist or anarchist basis is in practice a recent 
one, dating back perhaps to the 18th century (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000) and 
more substantially to the second half of the 19th century. The revival of globally 
networked opposition to these forms of power makes these experiences of 
continuing relevance. 
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